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BEYOND THE WARREN COURT
AND ITS CONSERVATIVE CRITICS:
TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Donald A. Dripps*

For at least twenty years, most popular, political, and
scholarly commentary about constitutional criminal procedure
has taken the form of a debate between defenders and critics
of the Warren Court. I shall refer to defenders of the Warren
Court criminal procedure decisions as liberals, and to critics
of these cases as conservatives.'
I shall argue that the
contending camps subscribe to inconsistent premises, that
neither set of premises is entirely satisfactory, and that a
revised version of conservative premises has the potential to
support a comprehensive and coherent theory of constitutional
criminal procedure. It turns out, however, that the regime
suggested by these revised conservative premises greatly
resembles the body of doctrine laid down by the Warren Court.
The liberal perspective recognizes the necessity of enforcing
the criminal law.2 But the liberal perspective qualifies that

* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. Northwestern University,
1980; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1983. 1 am grateful for the comments
of Yale Kamisar on an earlier draft of this Article. Responsibility for the opinion
expressed in it is mine, solely.
1. I resort to these labels with some awareness of their potential for misrepresentation. We live at a time when the "conservatives" in China and the Soviet Union are
doctrinaire Maoists and Bolsheviks, respectively. But the persistence of these terms
offers powerful evidence of their utility, if not necessity. Cf. R. ROTUNDA, THE
POLITICS OF LANGUAGE: LIBERALISM AS A WORD AND SYMBOL (1986) (tracing use of
"liberal" label in modern political history).
2. An extensive literature compares and contrasts the approaches of the Warren
and Burger Courts to criminal procedure. Two thoughtful and provocative examples
are Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983); and Seidman, Factual
Guilt and the Burger Court:An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal
Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980). The seminal contribution to the literature
on conservative and liberal models of criminal procedure is H. PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153-246 (1968). Other comparisons of the liberal/Warren
Court and the conservative/Burger Court perspectives include Israel, Criminal
Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 77 MICH. L. REV.
1319 (1977); Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the
Burger Court (Was It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?),and Police Investigatory
Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62 (V.
Blasi ed. 1983); Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of ConstitutionalCriminal
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necessity by affirming the values of individual autonomy and
equality among persons, values that frequently compete with
law enforcement. The Warren Court identified these latter
values in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
compelling respect for autonomy and equality from legislative
majorities that for decades had remained indifferent to police
excesses and unimpressed by egalitarian considerations. 3
The modern conservative perspective on criminal procedure
evolved in reaction to the Warren Court decisions in Mapp,4
Gideon,5 Escobedo6 , Miranda,7 and Massiah.8
This
perspective's fundamental premise is that rational criminal
procedure should have the primary object of determining the
truth of a criminal charge. The dissenters in the Warren
Court landmarks typically linked this premise with the
importance of precedent as a constraint on the legitimate
authority of the Court. But now that the sea changes of the
sixties have become venerated precedents themselves, conservative commentators have adopted a distinct but related
premise regarding legitimacy. This premise holds that the
federal courts ought to construe the fourteenth amendment
according to the intentions of its framers.9 Contemporary
conservatives believe that this premise complements the
Procedurein the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980); Schulhofer, The
Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH.
U.L.Q. 11 (1988); Weisberg, Foreword: CriminalProcedureDoctrine: Some Versions
of the Skeptical, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832 (1985); see also Pye, The Warren
Court and Criminal Procedure,67 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1968).
3. The concern for equality is probably the single most salient distinction between
the Warren Court and its predecessors and successors. This distinctive concern
seemed for a time destined to make the equal protection clause the centerpiece of
constitutional criminal procedure. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(state that provides representation for the indigent must furnish representation on
appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state may not deny indigent defendant
free transcript for purposes of preparing appeal). But the Court stopped short of
declaring poverty a suspect classification. The universally approved decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), rested not on the equal protection clause
but on the due process clause. Ultimately, the Court settled upon a doctrine that set
a constitutional minimum of procedural protection even for the poor, without denying
a more elaborate defense to those who can afford one.
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 2, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573
(1989) [hereinafter REPORT NO. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].
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primacy of truth finding, because they ascribe intentions to
the framers that for the most part leave criminal procedure to
the determination of the political process. Conservatives
therefore oppose freeing the guilty as a remedy for government
violations of autonomy or equality. °
By focusing on the Warren Court's casual attitude toward
constitutional interpretation in criminal cases, and on the
primacy in criminal procedure of determining guilt and
innocence, the conservative perspective captures some important truths. Indeed, conservatism enjoys judicial ascendancy,
not just on the Supreme Court, but with few exceptions in the
lower federal courts and in their state counterparts as well.
I shall argue, however, that the conservative perspective in its
prevailing form is deeply flawed.
Specifically, I shall claim that invoking the intentions of the
framers is a problematic basis for constitutional criminal
procedure. Indeed, the conservative perspective admits as
much by deploying the primacy of the truth-finding function,
nowhere mentioned in the constitutional text and never
articulated in the legislative history, as a guide to constitutional adjudication. I shall argue that in constitutional terms
the relevant value is not finding the truth but preventing
unjust punishment. Prevailing conservative thought not only
mischaracterizes this value, but also refuses to promote it
outside the narrow confines of the criminal trial. Yet the
methods of criminal investigation-arrest, search, and
interrogation-in effect can punish innocent people the government never charges, let alone tries. The central meaning of
due process forbids punishment without trial, a prohibition
that speaks primarily to state action that does not culminate
in a trial.
Constitutional criminal procedure instead should assume for
its premises the preference for avoiding unjust conviction and
the neutral application of the same conventions of interpretation that the justices bring to bear on other issues of constitutional law to the due process clause in criminal cases. These
premises differ only subtly from their conservative counterparts, but projected far enough a difference of a few degrees
can result in a tremendous divergence. Those who accept
these latter premises, including many who call themselves
conservatives, are likely to approve most of the Warren Court

10.

See id. at 578.
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decisions that present conservatives condemn.
Part I develops more fully the differences that divide liberal
and conservative commentators on criminal procedure, taking
special note of the series of Reports prepared by the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Policy and published recently in
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform." Part II
explains my disquiet with the suggestion that originalmeaning jurisprudence ought to guide criminal procedure
doctrine. Part II also defends the thesis that the fourteenth
amendment protects the individual interest in freedom from
unjust punishment, rather than any abstract interest in truth
for its own sake. Part III considers two familiar controversies
in criminal procedure-the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule and confessions-from the revised perspective developed
in Part II. Part IV adumbrates some possible applications of
the revised perspective to trial procedure. These possibilities
illustrate that the risk of unjust punishment remains very far
from irreducible, and that the fourteenth amendment authorizes measures to move this risk closer to its practical minimum.
What emerges is more than a critique of modern conservative thinking about criminal procedure. If we adopt the
revised premises I propose, we will understand as we have not
before why due process has implications for police practices as
well as for trial procedure. We will understand as we have not
before that the guilty should go free only when the protection
of the innocent requires this result. And we will understand,
perhaps with the disappointment that comes from living in an
imperfect world, that principled constitutionalism permits
what the security of the innocent requires-limits on the
enforcement of the criminal law very much like those set by
the Warren Court.

I. THE CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The conservative school of thought regarding criminal
procedure had its precursor in Bentham, 1 2 its founder in

11.
12.

Truth in Criminal Justice Series, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989).
See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827).
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Wigmore, 3 and a gifted, although on the Supreme Court
level out-voted, generation of exemplars in Harlan, 4 Friendly,' 5 Barrett, 6
Bator, 7 Vorenborg,"8
Inbau, I9
and
2
Oaks. " Today its prominent advocates include Chief Justice
Rehnquist,2 Justices White 22 and Scalia, 223 and academics
24
such as Joseph Grano and Gerald Caplan. 1
Of course, not all of these individuals agree about every
issue in criminal procedure. They share, however, a common
perspective that emphasizes the primacy of truth-finding
among the functions of the criminal trial and the primacy of
the framers' intentions in constitutional interpretation.26
The conjunction of these premises is not inevitable: Bentham,
for example, cared deeply about the truth-finding function
and, naturally enough, not at all about the intentions of the
framers.2 7 Wigmore too gave priority to truth finding, but
you will not find much about the founders' intentions in the
work of that master of the common law. 28 Not until the

13.
See, e.g., 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2250 (1st ed. 1905) (arguing that the fifth amendment should be
construed narrowly); 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2184 (2d ed. 1923) (arguing that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule based on "misguided sentimentality" leads to "coddling the criminal
classes").
14.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15.
See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965).
16.
See, e.g., Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or
Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 11 (1962).
17. See, e.g., Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogationand the Right
to Counsel:Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62
(1966).
18. See, e.g., id.
19. See, e.g., Inbau, Police Interrogation-APracticalNecessity, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16 (1961).
20. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
21.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
22. See, e.g., id. at 246 (White, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's opinion, which denied the
cognizability of Miranda claims on federal habeas corpus.
24. See, e.g., Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA.
L. REV. 859 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985).
26. This perspective is also presented in REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 9, at 575.
27. See generally J. BENTHAM, supra note 12.
28. See supra note 13. Wigmore urged a narrow construction of the fifth
amendment not because the founders intended that construction but because that
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Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to require the
frustration of the truth-finding mission in state criminal trials
did the conservative perspective emerge in its modern form.
Modern conservatism evolved in the dissenting opinions in
Mapp, Escobedo, Miranda, and Massiah. In Mapp, Justice
Harlan's dissent relies on the probative value of illegally
seized evidence, the constitutional importance of federalism,
and stare decisis.2 9 Likewise, Justice White's dissent in
Massiah emphasizes the truth-finding function and precedent,
without discussing the intent of the founders:
The current incidence of serious violations of the law
represents not only an appalling waste of the potentially
happy and useful lives of those who engage in such
conduct but also an overhanging, dangerous threat to those
unidentified and innocent people who will be the victims
of crime today and tomorrow....
It is therefore a rather portentous occasion when a
constitutional rule is established barring the use of
evidence which is relevant, reliable and highly probative
of the issue which the trial court has before it-whether
the accused committed the act with which he is charged.
Without the evidence, the quest for truth may be seriously
impeded and in many cases the trial court, although aware
of proof showing defendant's guilt, must nevertheless
release him because the crucial evidence is deemed
inadmissible."
The connection with the framers' intentions, however, was not
long in coming.
Only five weeks later, dissenting in Escobedo, Justice White
questioned the legitimacy, as well as the wisdom, of excluding
probative evidence. The loss of evidence was indefensible
because "[n]either the Framers, the constitutional language,
a century of decisions of this Court nor Professor Wignore

construction made sense as a matter of policy. His critique of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule included historical dimensions, but again Wigmore saw the
.essential fallacy" of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), and Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), as the disregard of the common-law principle that no
trial should become an inquest into collateral matters. 4 J. WIGMORE (2d ed.), supra
note 13, at § 2184.
29.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207-08 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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provide[d] an iota of support" for the majority's approach.3 1
White argued that Escobedo fashioned, not constitutional law,
but a "new American judges' rule." In his view, Escobedo
demonstrated that even judges "can make mistakes and exceed
their authority."3 2 In the final paragraph of his dissent,
Justice White deployed the conservative approach in modern
form. Law enforcement, although not yet "destroyed by the
rule announced today," would nonetheless "be crippled and its
task made a great deal more difficult, all in my opinion, for
unsound, unstated reasons, which can find no home in any of
the provisions of the Constitution."3 3
The Miranda dissenters adopted a similar posture. Justice
Harlan wrote that the Court's holding "require[d] a strained
reading of history and precedent and a disregard of the very
pragmatic concerns that alone may on occasion justify such
strains."3 4 For Justice White, constitutional interpretation
necessarily entailed making new law based on policy choices.
But notwithstanding this concession, Justice White dissented
in part because the majority approach had "no significant
support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the
Fifth Amendment."3 5 In any event, "[e]qually relevant" as
text and history "is an assessment of the rule's consequences
measured against community values."3 6 On this score the
frustration of the truth-finding function should have foreclosed
the majority's textual exegesis, for "[p]articularly when
corroborated ... confessions have the highest reliability and
significantly contribute to the certitude with which we may
believe the accused is guilty." 7
Time has not diminished the value of determining the truth
at trial or the importance of legitimacy in making constitutional law. The conservative school continues to rely on these
values. But legitimacy has assumed for conservatives a more
rigid meaning than it did for Justices White and Harlan.
Indeed, the conservative positions of the 1960s and those of
the 1980s differ most obviously in that contemporary conservatives deny what Justices Harlan and White admitted, namely,

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 497 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 498-99 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 499 (White, J., dissenting).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
384 U.S. at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
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that the intent of the framers is only one component in
legitimate constitutional interpretation.3 8
In this regard the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Policy has provided a good illustration of modern conservative
thinking in its Truth in Criminal Justice Series.39 The very
title of the series suggests the continuing value placed on
discovering the truth at trial, even if it also hints at the need
to dispel ideological disinformation spread by liberal law
professors and the like. The Attorney General's preface to the
Reports asserts that "the criminal justice system must be
devoted to discovering the truth."4 ° Each of the Reports
criticizes prevailing criminal procedure doctrine for keeping
relevant evidence from the trier of fact. But the Reports give
priority to the intentions of the framers and not to the value
of the truth-finding mission.
For example, the first of the Reports urges the overruling of
Miranda because that decision's "promulgation of a code of
procedure for interrogations constituted a usurpation of
legislative and administrative powers, thinly disguised as an
The Report asexercise in constitutional exegesis . . ."
signs only secondary priority to the contention that Miranda
"impairs the ability of the government to protect the public."42
The second Report likewise criticizes the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule as follows:
*.

First, the rule has no support in the "original intent or
meaning" of the Framers of the Constitution. Second, the
validity of the rule's deterrence rationale has yet to be
demonstrated. Third, among its other drawbacks, the rule
impairs significantly the search for truth in criminal
justice. Finally, alternative methods for deterring and
redressing fourth amendment violations exist or could be
created, and those alternatives would be more effective
and less costly than the exclusionary rule.4 3

38.

REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 591-94.

39.

22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437 (1989).

40.
Meese, Introduction to OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES (1986-88).
41.
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERIES, REPORT No. 1, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL

INTERROGATION (1986), reprintedin 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437, 543 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT NO. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION].

42.
43.

Id.
REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 575.
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Only where the rules obstructing the search for truth are not
founded on the Constitution do the Reports place primary
emphasis on truth.' Indeed, one Report concludes that the
original understanding of the Constitution requires the
frustration of the truth-finding function.4 5
This shift in priority is no accident; the modern emphasis on
the framers' understanding is necessary if the Warren Court
precedents are to be overruled. The Warren Court dissenters
had precedent on their side, and they could deploy the value
of the truth-finding mission as a powerful reason to refrain
from decisions of doubtful legitimacy. Modern conservatives
now confront the Warren Court decisions as settled precedents, and legal method requires that the conservatives assign
some authority higher than precedent to justify departing from
it.
Professor Grano, in his introduction to the reissue of the
Reports, makes the conservative program explicit. In his view,
the Reports have the attractive potential "to foster the
intellectual environment that will inspire the Rehnquist Court
to undertake the much needed fundamental critique of the
status quo" in criminal procedure.4 6
Original meaning
jurisprudence would provide the point of attack against
Warren Court precedents. Once those be interred, "[t]he first
step in any fundamental reexamination of the existing order
should involve an evaluation of the importance of truth
discovery relative to other goals the system might have. " "
Naturally, "discovery of truth must be primary," but not "the
only desideratum."4 8
It would not be unfair to ask why original-meaning
jurisprudence loses its priority when the subject is preventive detention rather than Miranda,or more generally why
original-meaning jurisprudence trumps the Warren Court
44.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT NO. 4,
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE
ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL HISTORIES AT TRIAL (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L.

REF. 707 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT NO. 4, CRIMINAL HISTORIES].
45.
See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 6, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS (1987), reprintedin 22 U. MICH.

J.L. REF. 831 (1989).
46.
Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure:The Contributionof the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 402 (1989).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 403.
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precedents but the regime to be built on their ashes is to be
governed by a policy preference for truth rather than an
historical assay of the due process clause. It also might be fair
to wonder if the Reports do not object to selective incorporation, the least historically defensible Warren Court doctrine,
because their authors wish to dilute constitutional limits on
federal power in the name of federalism.4 9 But notwithstanding these embarrassing questions, the conservative
position has some attractive components, advanced by effective
advocates. Answers to their arguments are not to be found in
the opinions of the Warren Court majorities. Indeed, if their
premises be granted, I do not think their arguments can be
answered at all.

II. WHAT'S RIGHT, AND WRONG,
WITH THE CONSERVATIVE PREMISES

The relation between the two premises of conservative
thinking about criminal procedure makes sense, if you take
conservative rhetoric at face value. When the Constitution,
construed as its framers intended, does protect a value that
competes with the truth-finding function, conservatives admit
that original intent has priority over their policy preference for
truth. They claim only that Warren Court doctrine lacks a
legitimate basis in the Constitution and therefore has the
compound defect of illegitimately imposing bad policy.5"
This conservative critique of the Warren Court's criminal
justice decisions has considerable force. It is hard to deny that
some of these decisions reflect a casual attitude toward the
51
constitutional text, its historic meaning, and stare decisis.

49. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129-36 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that selective incorporation in practice tends to dilute federalism).
50. REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 591-602.
51. In the words of a sympathetic critic:
It is important, however, not to canonize the Warren Court and not to regard
its works as sacrosanct. It was often wrong and wrongheaded. It frequently
failed to articulate its decisions adequately and sometimes appeared to doubt
the importance of adequate articulation. It was frequently self-righteous and
intolerant of competing considerations. At times it flouted the Court conventions when adherence to them would have cost little and might have marshalled
greater support for the innovations it was effecting. Strangely enough, one of
the most serious criticisms of the Court is that often, having embarked upon a
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At the same time, truth in adjudication is an important
value. 2 So in at least some cases, the conservatives can
fairly charge the Warren Court not only with imposing policy
preferences in the guise of constitutional law, but with
imposing the wrong policy preferences as well.
The sine qua non of Warren Court doctrine was the incorporation into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause of
the specific rights enumerated in the first eight amendments.
For a time Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter debated the
former's total incorporation thesis according to familiar canons
of constitutional interpretation.5 3 But in Mapp, Gideon, and
Malloy5 4 the fourteenth amendment does not seem to be the
object of discussion. One may approve or condemn the
holdings, but the majority opinions leave the impression that
their authors believed that nothing further could be said on
the subject of incorporation, and wrote only to report a change
of votes. From the standpoint of conventional constitutional
interpretation, there was something to be said for fundamental fairness, and something to be said for total incorporation;
but what the Warren Court served up was a selective incorporation doctrine for which, at least in conventional terms,
almost nothing could be said.
Miranda depends on Malloy; Massiah depends on Gideon;
and Aguilar5 5 and Terry5 6 depend on Mapp. The foundations of modern constitutional criminal procedure doctrine
therefore rest on intellectual landfill. Although this does not
establish that the conservatives are right, it does establish the
importance of their project. For by insisting on legitimacy in
constitutional adjudication of criminal cases, and by appealing
to the truth-finding value as a policy consideration to resolve

problem it did not go far enough.
Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 539-40 (footnotes omitted).
52.
In every legal tradition, discovering the truth is at least one of the important
goals of the criminal trial. See Damaska, EvidentiaryBarriersto Conviction and Two
Models of CriminalProcedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973)
(examining the priority of the truth-finding function in common-law, civil-law, and
socialist legal systems).
53. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
54. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
55. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (two-pronged test for determining
probable cause based on confidential informant).
56. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (reasonable suspicion standard applies to
decision to stop suspect on the street; inquiry into the reasonableness of search-andseizure activity is the touchstone of the fourth amendment).
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ambiguities in constitutional authority, the conservatives offer
an account that demands a response. If the Warren Court
regime is to endure, its contemporary defenders must offer
stronger arguments than those that appear in the majority
opinions in Mapp, Miranda,and Massiah. This defense can be
made, but only by questioning the premises of the conservative
approach.

A. Questioning Originalismin
ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure

By appealing to the historic meaning of the Constitution, the
conservatives have moved the debate about criminal procedure
away from the specialized concerns of criminal-law professionals and into the domain of constitutional theorists. The
conservatives rightly criticize the Supreme Court's habit of
deciding criminal cases under the fourteenth amendment as
though the justices held some supervisory power over state
prosecutions. Perhaps in criminal cases the Court's institutional competence achieves its zenith, but competence requires
legitimate authority before it becomes binding, and the state
courts, being closer to the subject, have at least as much in the
way of institutional competence as their federal overseer. In
fairness, the tendency to ignore traditional tests of constitutionality in criminal cases has outlived the Warren Court,5"
but that does little to rehabilitate Mapp and Miranda.
If the conservatives have properly removed the contest to the
field of constitutional theory, they seem unaware of how large
that field has become. Nowadays it is not enough to say
"intent" and then cite the usual secondary sources for the
usual conclusion that it is not certain that the framers
intended the exclusionary rule or pre-interrogation warnings.
Constitutional theory is itself problematic, so the conservatives have set course not for a safe haven but for the most
open of stormy intellectual seas.5"

57.
See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a six-person
jury is constitutional); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that
preventive detention is constitutional).
58.
The literature on constitutional theory is vast, perhaps tumescent. But no one
interested in law could fail to profit from reading any sample that includes J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J. ELY,
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Like originalists in the more general debates about constitutional interpretation, the conservatives make the plausible
argument that noninterpretative judicial review is antidemocratic and therefore illegitimate. What the conservatives do
not explain, and what their allies in the more general debate
likewise do not explain, is why originalist judicial review is
legitimate, even though it too is antidemocratic.5 9
The most plausible attempt links the legitimacy of interpretive review to an artificial notion of consent. "We the people"
consented to the terms of the Constitution when "we" ratified
the instrument and its amendments. But this is sheer
fiction; you and I could not consent to anything in 1868 or
60
1789, and nobody has asked our consent more recently.
Blacks and women did not even have enfranchised
predecessors-in-interest.
What most of us have accepted, what most of us invoke
when we claim the protection of the Constitution, is not the
instrument interpreted historically, but the instrument
interpreted judicially. Judicial interpretation most emphatically does not mean interpreted with the same freedom with
which we might suppose that Derrida reads Empson, but it
just as surely does not mean interpreted historically. I am not
an historian, but very strong cases can be made that the
post-New Deal commerce clause cases and Brown v. Topeka
Board of Education6 1 contravened the intentions of the
framers." If the bulk of the government's domestic activity,
activity on which the commitments of whole generations rely,
is not unconstitutional, it is necessary for more than the

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE (1988); M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Bork, Neutral

Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
59.
See Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
ConstitutionalScholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1261 (1984)
("The debate over judicial review must be shifted to fairer grounds. First, it must
acknowledge that all judicial review is antimajoritarian and that it is useless and
dishonest to criticize noninterpretive review as being uniquely antidemocratic.");
Simon, The Authority of the Framersof the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretation be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985) (surveying standard arguments for
legitimacy of interpretive review).
60.
Thus, Ely admits that the interpretive theory is "largely a fake," even though
he defends his own representation-reinforcing approach as "the ultimate
interpretivism." J. ELY, supra note 58, at 11, 87-88.
61.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62.
See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977); Grey, supra
note 58, at 710-14.
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intentions of the framers to count as valid sources of constitutional law. Bluntly put, originalism is not the law.
The hard part consists of saying just what does count as
constitutional law, once we admit what we practice and deny
the decisive importance of the original understanding. This is
a large question indeed, and I have taken it up in some
dubious work-in-progress.6 3 For present purposes I can
follow the conservative lead and simply describe a constitutional theory without justifying it. It is my belief that the
Constitution ought to be interpreted according to conventional
authorities; that these authorities can be discovered by
examining prior political decisions, especially judicial decisions; and that political decisions have affirmed the authority of
the constitutional text, its historic purposes identified at a
high level of generality, and precedents. When these authorities do not propound in one direction or another, considerations of policy have determined the result.
My foray into constitutional theory may not persuade
anyone. But any constitutionaltheory that does not demand
the overthrow of the welfare/regulatorystate, the recision of
first amendment rights against the states, and the reversal of
the constitutionalproscriptionof racialsegregationmust come
to something like the same approach. Given that the original
understanding has not constrained constitutional interpretation on crucial issues, the constraints on constitutional
interpretation are more vague than originalists suppose.'
Either that, or there are no constraints. One could take the
manifest disregard of original intent in practice as a warrant
for the critical legal studies conclusion that law is only power,
much as a fundamentalist Christian might take Darwin as a
warrant for atheism.
Those who study criminal procedure are not likely to elide
the principled alternatives for constitutional interpretation
between rigid originalism and unconstrained judicial discretion. Whoever reads criminal procedure cases realizes that
because of doctrine real people face massive consequences.
Because of doctrine, one murderer goes free to kill again and
another one is executed. So doctrine matters, but its constraints are subtle and so rooted in policy that the two seem

63.
D. Dripps, Political Obligation and Constitutional Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
64.
See Simon, supra note 59.
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much the same.
On the level of theory, students of criminal procedure would
do well to revisit the Miranda dissenting opinions. Justice
Harlan conceded that "pragmatic concerns" on occasion could
justify straining "history and precedent."6 5 And modern
conservatives should consider the words of Justice White:
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor
even strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth
Amendment, is at odds with American and English legal
history, and involves a departure from a long line of
precedent does not prove either that the Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or unwise in its
present reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment. It does,
however, underscore the obvious-that the Court has not
discovered or found the law in making today's decision, nor
has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has
done is to make new law and new public policy in much
the same way that it has in the course of interpreting
other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the
Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what it must do
and will continue to do until and unless there is some
fundamental change in the constitutional distribution of
governmental powers.
But if the Court is here and now to announce new and
fundamental policy to govern certain aspects of our affairs,
it is wholly legitimate to examine the mode of this or any
other constitutional decision in this Court and to inquire
into the advisability of its end product in terms of the longrange interest of the country. At the very least the Court's
text and reasoning should withstand analysis and be a fair
exposition of the constitutional provision which its opinion
interprets. Decisions like these cannot rest alone on
syllogism, metaphysics or some ill-defined notions of
natural justice, although each will perhaps play its part.66
Much more could be said on the subject of constitutional

65.
66.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 531-32 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote ommited).
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theory, but for the purposes of criminal procedure it should
suffice to conclude that the appeal to originalism could not
bring down the Warren Court criminal cases without also
bringing down much else of greater value than, say, the right
result on the exclusionary rule issue.

B. Qualifying the Pursuit of Truth
as the Primary Value in Criminal Procedure

From the foregoing discussion one might conclude that I
think constitutional criminal procedure is pure policy. That
is far from the case, and in what follows I shall rely on
authority far more than on unconstrained notions of policy. I
agree with the conservatives that authority has logical priority
over policy; but because for many, at least psychologically, this
priority is reversed, I would like to discuss the value of truth
finding as a matter of pure policy. Ultimately I shall argue
that a particular, and morally justified, policy program is
authoritatively affirmed by the due process clause and the
cases construing it. My interpretation of authority will be
more persuasive if skeptical readers first consider some
qualifications on the value of truth-finding quite aside from
doctrinal constraints.
I am, as some might suspect from my critique of the privilege against self-incrimination,6 7 sympathetic to the truthfinding mission of criminal procedure. I also believe that
formal procedure has only instrumental value.6" Previous
critiques of the conservative focus on truth finding have not

67.
Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988).
68.
Some distinguished commentators have defended the value of formal
procedure for its own sake in the context of the Supreme Court's administrativeentitlement, due process cases. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1493 (1968); Michelman, Formal
and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 126 (1977)
(Nomos XVIII, Yearbook of the Am. Soc'y for Pol. & Legal Phil.). Nonetheless, the
courts have consistently refused to recognize a constitutional right to procedure
divorced from any constitutionally protected substantive interest, and the balance of
arguments seems to support that conclusion. E.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see also Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 657, 674-75; Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85,
115-118.
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disturbed these biases. Professor Arenella correctly points out
that most criminal trials call upon the jury to make normative
as well as positive judgments about the defendant's conduct.6 9 He does not, however, explain how the exclusion of
probative evidence enhances the jury's normative judgments.
Professor Seidman condemns the conservatives for not
taking the truth-finding function as the sole goal of adjudication. 7' He objects to grafting consequentialist goals onto the
criminal process because of the disrespect for individuals
implicit in deciding a criminal case on any basis other than
the defendant's blameworthiness. 7'
This critique of the
conservative emphasis on truth as hypocritical rhetoric is, I
think, mistaken. According to Professor Seidman's argument,
a sincere commitment to truth as a value in adjudication must
place truth in adjudication as the supreme value, for any
constraint on the truth-finding function amounts to "social
engineering" to achieve extraneous ends.
No one, not even Professor Seidman,72 places this ultimate
value on truth in adjudication. Kantians and utilitarians alike
admit the value of privileges and the constraints of time and
resources. Indeed, to value truth in adjudication at the
expense of truth when punishment is imposed outside the
adjudicatory context is incoherent. 73 To criticize conservatives or liberals for admitting the competition of truth with
other values fails to recognize that the value placed on truth
is measured against other values we are willing to sacrifice for
it. That the conservatives place primary, not exclusive, value
on truth does not establish either inconsistency or identity of
position with their liberal antagonists.
So I am skeptical about much of what others have said

69. See Arenella, supra note 2, at 197-98.
70. See Seidman, supra note 2. The gist of Professor Seidman's argument is that
"the Burger Court's criminal procedure decisions are not consistent with a guilt-orinnocence model" because "the Court has continued to use the criminal justice system
as a tool for social engineering, even when this pursuit of broad social goals conflicts
with the need to reach factually reliable judgments in individual cases." He objects
to this continuing "habit of treating criminal defendants as bit players in a larger
social struggle." Id. at 437.
71.
Id. at 501-03. Professor Seidman's analysis in this respect closely resembles
the stimulating discussion of"Expressive Aspects of Criminal Procedure" found in C.
FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 125-32 (1970).

72.
Professor Seidman concludes his article by questioning both the possibility
and the desirability of exclusive devotion to truth in adjudication. See Seidman,
supra note 2, at 502-03.
73.
See infra text following note 83.
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against the conservative's focus on the value of truth finding
at trial. But conservatives make two mistakes in describing
the precise form of truth seeking that has value in the
criminal process: first, they fail to discriminate false convictions from false acquittals; second, they limit the primacy of
the truth-finding function to formal proceedings.
Conservatives appeal to truth finding almost exclusively in
the context of criticizing doctrines that result in the acquittal
of persons known to be guilty. With the peculiar exception of
the self-incrimination privilege, however, these doctrines have
the purpose of insulating the innocent from punishment.7 4
Frequently, and almost always if analysis is restricted
arbitrarily to the trial context, these doctrines benefit more
persons known to be guilty than they benefit persons known
to be innocent. For conservatives, this is the end of the story.
This pattern of argument avoids the principle, admitted by
most conservatives,7 5 that an unjust conviction is far worse
than an unjust acquittal.
This principle is necessarily
relative, because the only way to prevent all unjust convictions
is to abandon enforcement of the criminal law. Blackstone put
the acceptable ratio at ten false negatives to one false positive;7 6 the ratio need not be precisely determined for the
principle to have great force.
In part, the principle's force follows from utilitarian considerations. Unjust convictions impose a tremendous cost on the
defendant, and a considerable cost on society. Moreover,
utilitarian reasoning suggests a profound skepticism about the
cost of acquitting the guilty. In the first place, scarcity of

74. For a discussion of the relationship between the fourth amendment and the
protection of innocent people, see Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for
Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983).
75.
See Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 461 (1989) ("Whether treated as a moral, constitutional, or
popular sentiment inquiry, the greater injustice is almost universally seen in the
conviction of the innocent.") (footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, "[s]ome dissenting
voices have been raised." Id. at 461 n.22. In an early article, Professor Grano took
an agnostic view of the preference for a high ratio of false acquittals to false
convictions. See Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any ConstitutionalSafeguards
Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717 (1974).
So far as I know, his is the only expressed reservation by a prominent conservative
about the distinction between false positives and false negatives. See, e.g., In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stressing "fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free").
76.

4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
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prison resources means that individual acquittals do not affect
the prison population." Given that selective incapacitation
remains problematic," false acquittals may not cost anything
in terms of unprevented crimes. Who can say that Willy
Horton 79 committed graver outrages than would have been
committed by the felon confined in the prison space his
furlough made available? As for deterrence, how many street
criminals count on being arrested, bound over, indicted, and
then freed on a "technicality"? Invisible lost convictions do not
affect general deterrence. Given that freeing the guilty for
constitutional reasons has become virtually exotic,8" the
suggestion that crime will decrease if the Warren Court
precedents are overruled is "inutterable nonsense."8 '
Even if substantially reducing the number of unjust acquittals, at the expense of a slight increase in the number of
unjust convictions, would reduce the crime rate measurably,

77.
Consider the results of the severe sentencing legislation adopted in Tennessee
in 1979. The legislation identified a variety of Class X felonies. The law required
that the court approve any plea bargaining down from a Class X charge, forbade
probation, suspended sentences and bail pending appeal for those convicted of Class
X crimes, and mandated that 40% of each Class X sentence's time be served before
parole. 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 318, codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-701 to 391-704. Despite these apparent hammer blows at penological discretion, the average
length of sentence for armed robbery in Tennessee declined under the law. See
Thomas & Edelman, An Evaluation of Conservative Crime Control Theology, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 123, 135-36 (1988). Perhaps the parole board, when forced to
retain all Class X convicts for 40% of the nominal sentence's time, paroled convicts
after the 40% period who otherwise would have served a higher percentage of the
nominal sentence's time. This provision was repealed when Tennessee revamped its
criminal law in 1989. 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591.
78.
See, e.g., Cohen, Selective Incapacitation:An Assessment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
253, 264-276 (discussing daunting empirical challenge of predicting individual
criminal propensity). Cohen suggests an incapacitative strategy based on targeting
the specific crimes of burglary and robbery rather than specific criminals. But,
assuming in arguendo that such a strategy might succeed, the resource constraint
means that not all guilty burglars and robbers can be committed for long sentences.
If a guilty robber or burglar is acquitted, it means only that another guilty robber or
burglar will occupy the prison space.
79.
Furloughed murderer Horton raped a woman, thereby becoming grist for the
1988 presidential campaign. See Dukakis Now Supports Ban on Furloughs for
Murderers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, § I, at 30, col. 6.
80. See infra note 149 (reviewing the empirical data on frequency of successful
suppression motions).
81. An Attorney General, rather different from his counterparts of the eighties,
offered this assessment of the claim that the Warren Court criminal procedure
landmarks had contributed to the crime rate. See ControllingCrime Through More
Effective Law Enforcement, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1967)
(statement of Aaron Koota, quoting Nicholas deB. Katzenbach).
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considerations of justice counsel against such a reduction. No
doubt the aggregate amount of happiness matters, but the
distribution of happiness matters too. We might not agree
with Rawls and insist that every institution do no injury to
the least well-off before we call it justified, 2 but few would
deny that individuals suffer a disproportionate share of the
costs of crime control when convicted for offenses they did not
commit."3
If the connection between marginally increasing the risk of
punishment run by the guilty and preventing future crimes
were clearer than it is, or if a substantial number of crimes
that might be prevented involved homicide or aggravated
assault, perhaps the victims of undeterred offenses might have
a stronger claim upon those whose guilt the evidence suggests
but fails to prove. We should nonetheless abjure a casual
attitude toward punishing the innocent as too dangerous a
political principle to have at large. Consideration of the utility
of practices and principles tends to merge with deonotological
thinking. 84 From either perspective, thoughtful people would
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 87 (1971). Rawls criticizes classical
82.
utilitarianism for failing to "take seriously the distinction between persons." Id. at
§ 5, at 27. The utilitarian is indifferent toward the distribution of happiness, caring
only for its aggregate quantity. Hence the utilitarian is willing to enact policies that
confer great happiness on a few at the expense of a small cost to many, or that confer
a small benefit to many but impose a ruinous cost on a few. One can agree with
Rawls' objection to this form of utilitarianism, however, without fully subscribing to
the rigid difference principle derived from it by Rawls.
Bishop Paley compared the unjustly executed to soldiers killed in battle for
83.
their country. See Sundby, supra note 75, at 461 n.22. A fair estimate of the
nineteenth century can be derived from the knowledge that Holmes later compared
the execution of the guilty to the death of soldiers fighting for their country. 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 806 (M. Howe ed. 1953) (Holmes to Laski, Dec. 17, 1925).
Even in war, however, the object is to obtain victory with the fewest possible
casualties.
84.
Thus, R.M. Hare, the leading exponent of justifying categorical moral
principles on utilitarian grounds, offers the security of the innocent against criminal
penalties as an example of the kind of principle generated by his ethical system. See
R. HARE, MORAL THINKING 162 (1981):
Prima facie moral principles are needed for the conduct of those who administer
the law, and critical thinking has to select these principles . . . . Thus the
grounds of selection will be utilitarian; but the principles selected may not
themselves look utilitarian at all. They are likely to be, rather, of the sort dear
to deontologists and intuitionists; they will insist on things like not punishing
the innocent, not condemning people unheard, observing procedures in court
which are calculated to elicit the truth from witnesses and cause the jury to
attend to it, and so on. These prima facie principles of substantial, including
procedural, justice in the administration of the law will be selected by critical
thinking because their general acceptance is likely to further the interests of
those affected, all in all, considered impartially, i.e. with formal justice. So,
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prefer to inhabit a society with a strong commitment to
preventing unjust punishment." When conditions approach
anarchy this preference might shift, as it did, for example, in
Weimar Germany;8 6 but such examples considered after a
period no longer than a dozen years seem to confirm the
preference for acquittal.
I think most conservatives would have little quarrel with
these remarks. Conservatives, however, for the most part
ascribe a substantially, if not wholly, retributive purpose to
the substantive criminal law. 7 The retributive theory holds
that whether good consequences follow punishment or not,
society should punish criminals because criminals deserve
punishment. This is a notion supported by subtle arguments
and strong emotions, one I shall not challenge, or affirm, in
this context. I know of no one who has written about punishment who equates the escape of deserved punishment with the
infliction of undeserved punishment. Indeed it is said to be a
strong consideration of retributive theory that, unlike its
utilitarian alternative, it categorically forbids punishing the
innocent.8 8 The retributivist might modify this statement by
insisting that retributivism categorically forbids only the

though the principles may accord with those defended by intuitionists, their
justification is utilitarian.
85.
Compare R. HARE, supra note 84, and H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 22 (1968), with Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 1955 PHIL. REV. 1, 7-8,
and C. FRIED, supra note 71.
86.
Many causes contributed to the rise of Hitler, but flagrant political violence
is often listed as one factor. See, e.g., R. HERZSTEIN, ADOLPH HITLER AND THE
GERMAN TRAUMA 69 (1974) ("[By 1931, Center Party Chancellor Heinrich] Bruening
. * * had to juggle forces such as unemployment, political chaos on the streets, the
increasingly difficult, aged President von Hindenburg, a swing to the right by his own
party, and a recalcitrant Reichstag."). Whatever its causes, the Reichstag fire was
seen as a portent of Communist insurrection and enabled Hitler to.obtain emergency
powers from the Cabinet. See A. BRECHT, PRELUDE TO SILENCE 93 (1944); Mommsen,
The Reichstag Fireand its PoliticalConsequences, in REPUBLIC TO REICH 129, 129-30,
199-201 (H. Hulborn ed. 1972).
87.
Whatever theory of punishment they may subscribe to during moments of
detached reflection, conservative jurists seem to decide cases in accord with a
retributive impulse. The best example is the practice of conservative justices in
death penalty cases of describing the unsavory facts of each murder in some detail.
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2972-73 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 449 (1980) (White, J., dissenting). The
intensity of the conservative hostility to Mapp and Miranda likewise can be explained
only by retributivism, for on utilitarian grounds it is highly improbable that the
exclusionary rules increase the crime rate.
88.
See, e.g., P. BEAN, PUNISHMENT 29 (1981); McCloskey, A Nonutilitarian
Approach to Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM (M. Bayles ed. 1968).
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deliberate punishment of innocent individuals, 89 but on an
institutional level communities deliberately choose the risk of
error they will run. The retributivist scarcely could defend a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in criminal
cases with the apology that no particular jury deliberately
convicted the innocent. And the retributivist who commits
herself to a double-effect approach to convicting the innocent
on a statistical basis may not appeal logically to the rights of
statistically potential crime victims as justification for
increasing the acceptable ratio of false convictions to false
acquittals.
So I conclude that, from a policy standpoint, the criminal
justice system ought to value truth in an instrumental and
qualified manner. Truth at trial is not valuable because
knowledge is valuable. Indeed, conservatives are distressed
precisely because some due process doctrines prevent the
punishment of persons whose guilt is as certain after charges
are dismissed as it was before. Rather, truth in adjudication
is valuable because accurate factfinding enables punishment
of the guilty and precludes punishment of the innocent.
Because preventing unjust punishment is far more valuable
than enabling just punishment, the object of criminal procedure should not be to minimize the total number of errors, but
to minimize unjust acquittals subject to a very strong constraint that holds the number of unjust convictions to a
practical minimum.
The words "conviction" and "acquittal" suggest the second
conservative mistake in evaluating the truth-finding function.
Conservatives speak of truth at trial as though truth mattered
in no other context. This assumes that because the government hopes not to punish until after the trial, the government
does not punish before the trial. The assumption is false,
because many of the methods of criminal investigation are
punitive in effect. Consider an arrest: the person in custody
is as effectively imprisoned as he would be in a penitentiary,
and frequently under circumstances even less congenial.
Admittedly, any criminal justice system must tolerate the
arrest of many persons whose guilt is less than certain, and a
night's detention is not equivalent to a year's. The tolerable
ratio of false positives to false negatives will decrease as the
magnitude of innocent suffering declines. But the examples

89.

See C. FRIED, supra note 71, at 126.
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are not limited to search or arrest. Coercing confessions and
effecting arrest by gunshot at least rival criminal conviction in
the intensity of the suffering they inflict. Preventive detention
can be conviction's functional equivalent.
So the conservative insistence on viewing the trial as a
world unto itself is myopic. What happens at one person's
trial can alter what happens to another person on the street
or in the police station. The fate of the innocent often depends
on what happens to the guilty. Criminal procedure that
respects truth for its real value will have the object of convicting the guilty, so long as the innocent are not thereby punished either after a trial or without one. I turn now to
consider whether the fourteenth amendment permits the
federal courts to impose this kind of procedure on the states.

III. DUE PROCESS AND POLICE PRACTICES

"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "0 No constitutional provision has acquired, or shed, as many meanings as the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In criminal
cases due process came to mean "fundamental fairness," then
"selective incorporation"-because so many Bill of Rights
protections were essential to fundamental fairness.9 1 Neither
interpretation of the Due Process clause rests on secure
doctrinal foundations.9 2 Persuasive doctrinal considerations

90.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
91.
See, e.g., Israel, Selective Incorporation:Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
92.
The total incorporation theory enjoys some support from the records of
congressional deliberations over the proposed amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). But total incorporation was not
suggested during the campaign to ratify the amendment in the states. See Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding,2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). In the seminal fourteenth amendment
criminal procedure case, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), eight of the
Justices ruled that the fourteenth amendment did not require state grand jury
presentment, a procedure required in federal prosecutions by the fifth amendment.
The first Justice Harlan dissented, but did not mention the possibility of total
incorporation. Nor did Hurtado's lawyer raise the claim in the brief for the plaintiffin-error. Instead, both Hurtado and Harlan relied on Coke and Blackstone, both of
whom had rendered Magna Charta's "per legem terrae" to include both the grand and
petit jury procedures. Id. at 542-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Not until Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606-08 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting), is total incorporation put
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might yet justify at least much of the incorporation legacy,
although admittedly those who begin thinking about the issue
in the terms of Adamson v. California9 3-the 1947 decision
that identified natural law and total incorporation as the only
options for interpreting due process in criminal 'cases94-may
come to a contrary conclusion.
The language of the due process clause originates with Lord
Coke, who used it as a translation of Magna Charta's chapter
39.95 Chapter 39 states that no free man shall be punished
by the King except after a "judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land."96 The Barons imposed the provision on
King John in response to what they perceived as royal abuses.
One of these abuses was John's practice of execution before
Another
judgment,9 7 and not in any technical sense. 9

forward in a Supreme Court opinion, in a claim advanced under the privileges-andimmunities clause rather than the due process clause. If the original understanding
had encompassed total incorporation, four decades of legal malpractice by defense
lawyers around the country are the only possible explanation for the record.
Some modern defenders of total incorporation have sought to ground the theory
in antebellum, antislavery Republican ideology. See M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE:

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); cf

Commager, HistoricalBackgroundof the FourteenthAmendment, in THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 14 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970). This approach reads the amendment at an
extraordinarily high level of generality, only a little more definite than imputing to
the framers the purpose of fostering a good society. Moreover, this interpretation
seems to neglect that the Republicans who defended the proposed amendment
balanced their claims for the need to nationalize civil liberties with equally prominent
and frequent assertions that the amendment did not conflict with the legitimate
principles of federalism. See E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 258-59 (1988); W. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3-12, 110-47 (1988). Even if one is willing to read the
amendment as a coded message enacting all aspects of Republican ideology, total
incorporation does not comport with the weight of the evidence.
But if at least some historical support exists for total incorporation, there seems
to be none for selective incorporation as a doctrine apart from generalized notions of
substantive due process. And, as a matter of substantive due process, the criminal
procedures required by the Bill of Rights, qua procedures as opposed to the freedom
from arbitrary restraint that they protect, would be very hard to describe as
indispensable to ordered liberty. See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the
FourteenthAmendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 87-88 (1963).
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
93.
Id. at 49-54.
94.
See A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 298-315 (1968); H. TAYLOR, THE
95.
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 236-37 (1911); Kurland,

Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in the United States: "The Noble Lie," in S.
THORNE, W. DUNHAM, P. KURLAND & I. JENNINGS, THE GREAT CHARTER: FOUR
ESSAYS ON MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY 48, 62 (1965).
96.
The translation is taken from R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 123 (1957). The "and" is not wholly uncontroversial.
See R. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 379-80 (2d ed. 1914).
97.
See R. MOTT,DUE PROCESS OF LAW 33 (1926); R. McKECHNIE, supra note 96,
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abuse was the supplanting of customary feudal law with royal
law.9 9 Thus, even seven centuries ago, notions of due process
had both procedural and substantive components.' 0
These two components became profoundly confused with the

at 376-82.
98.
R. McKECHNIE, supra note 96, wrote that chapter 39's "object was to prohibit
John from resorting to what is sometimes whimsically known in Scotland as
'Jeddart justice,'" dropping the following footnote:
The same grim tradition applied to Lidford as to Jedburgh:
"I oft have heard of Lydford law,
How in the morn they hang and draw,
And sit in judgment after."
Id. at 376 & n.4 (citation omitted).
99.
See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 172-73 (2d
ed. 1899). It may be easier to see the connection between substance and procedure
in the circumstances of 1215 than in our own. If the King's will is the supreme law,
a judgment of peers would have provided scant protection to the Barons. Thus it
seems probable that the judgment of peers was to be rendered according to a law
holding priority over the King's will. See G. ADAMS, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION 167-76 (2d ed. 1920).
100. G. ADAMS, supra note 99, at 242-44, offers an illuminating passage, unbiased
by thoughts of school desegregation, abortion, or Miranda:
If the interpretation [here defended] as on the whole the more probable is
accepted, viz., that what the barons had in mind in this clause was not chiefly
the form of trial, but was the general body of the law and the rights which it
secured them, then the provision is to be regarded as reactionary in only a slight
degree. It uses words which can be later interpreted as securing a judicium
parium to the baronial class, but this particular point was not in mind in 1215;
what was then demanded was a trial according to law and securing to them
their legal rights. Taken in this sense clause 39 of Magna Carta would correspond somewhat closely to the general prohibition included in Amendment XIV
to the Constitution of the United States: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The clause is, I think we
must say, strictly feudal in character; the barons had in mind almost certainly
no one but their own order, and the court which they demanded was the king's
feudal court. From such a narrowly feudal point of view, ignoring the king's new
prerogative courts, they were entirely right in the demand they made. Under
the feudal law, alone considered, there was no way by which the king could
rightfully deprive them of their property, or personal liberty, or life, without a
judicium parium. The rather vague and general terms in which they stated
their demand, while they give us labour in interpretation, proved historically
fortunate, because, as men's legal ideas changed and feudalism disappeared,
they could be adapted to new conceptions of civil rights and seemed in the end
to embody a universal principle of political liberty. There is a sense in which it
is not wrong to say that this broader protection was secured to us by Magna
Carta, and also to say the same of the other rights once erroneously supposed
to be directly intended by the Charter, like the jury trial, Habeas Corpus, and
consent to taxation. What did secure them to us was in truth the steady
development of the limited monarchy and constitutional government which dates
from Magna Carta and without it could hardly have been. In this sense it would
not be incorrect to say that the sentence quoted above from the Constitution of
the United States is a modern formulation of clause 39.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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adoption of due process as a constitutional constraint on
American republican governments. The Barons naturally did
not fear the abuse of Parliament, which they dominated. It
made sense for them to force the King to promise to injure no
free man without obtaining, through fair procedures, a
judgment that customary substantive law authorized the
injury. 10 1 But what did the "law of the land" mean in a
representative democracy? If legislation constituted the law
10 2
of the land, the legislature could not violate the limitation.
Similarly, the procedural component is murky. Suppose a
facially fair procedure returns an adverse decision in the
absence of any evidence to support it? What protection is fair
procedure, if the substantive law authorizes arbitrary punishment? What does a fair procedure mean, anyway?
In its only full-fledged due process case before the Civil War,
the Supreme Court adopted a historical test and held that due
process meant any legal process that was approved by the
common law of England in 1789.103 The adoption of the
fourteenth amendment made this formulation unworkable,
assuming it was workable otherwise. When the State of
California adopted the prosecutorial information as a promising reform over the grand jury indictment process, the
Supreme Court encountered no difficulty in holding the new
procedure, anathema to the common law, consistent with the
Due process meant either a procedure
Constitution.0 4
known at common law, or a procedure approved by the
legislature within certain limits. 105 Thus substance and
procedure entwined like the serpents of a caduceus; the
substantive requirement that punishment comport with "the
law of the land" limited the procedures that could be adopted
by the states.
The law of the land:
refers to that law of the land in each State, which derives

101. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
102. See id. at 535-36.
103. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1855).
104. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529 ("[To hold that common-law pedigree] is essential
to due process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to
render it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and
Persians.").
105. Id. at 528-29.
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its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the
State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions, and the greatest
security for which resides in the right of the people 1to
0 6
make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure.
This was not written by Justice Brennan; rather it was
written by Justice Mathews for an all-but-unanimous Court
sixteen years after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. The Hurtado opinion forthrightly invokes a law higher
than the legislation of any state, a law thought to be accessible to, and enforceable by, the federal courts, although respect
for democracy counseled great deference to legislative choices.
Selective incorporation is a substantive due process doctrine.
Freedom of speech and worship, jury trial, security from
arbitrary search and seizure, the privilege against selfincrimination, and so on, all eventually found their way into
the Supreme Court's conception of "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions."'
Parallel arguments
constitutionalized, for a time, the liberty of contract.'
106. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. The case initiating federal constitutional scrutiny of state interference with
free expression, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), offers a good illustration
of the identity of doctrine underlying selective incorporation and substantive due
process. The Court assumed that freedom of speech and press "are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at 666. The Court
expressly rejected dictum to the contrary contained in Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922). The Gitlow opinion supports the repudiation of the
Cheek dictum with footnote nine, which cites Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462
(1907) ("But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and of the press were
protected from abridgment on the part not only of the United States but also of the
states . . . ."); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (a criminal procedure case
applying the "fundamental" liberty test to deny that due process prohibits comment
on invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915) (a notorious substantive due process case invalidating a state law prohibiting
'yellow dog" contracts); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) (holding that a
colorable constitutional question was raised by a state court decision, the opinion in
which declared that the federal constitution protects the freedom of speech); Schaefer
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (a federal prosecution of the publishers of a
German language newspaper for interfering with the war effort during World War
I); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (Court assumed without deciding that
the Constitution protects freedom of expression); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (a substantive due process decision striking down a state law that forbade
the teaching of foreign languages). The specific page references in Gitlow's footnote
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Yet the Hurtado opinion may not fairly be charged with
disregarding the constitutional text, legal history, or the
intentions of the framers. If the law of the land is legislation,
if fair procedure is what the legislature provides, then there
is no point to denying the states the right to punish without
due process." 9 The problem, recognized by the Hurtado
Court, is how to keep the due process clause from meaning
anything without reducing it to meaning nothing.
Critics argue that experience with substantive due process
has suggested that this cannot be done. 110 Regardless of
whether substantive due process should live or die, however,
there is no separating Lochner v. New York"' from Gitlow
v. New York," 2 Roe v. Wade," 3 and Mapp or Miranda on
grounds of legitimacy. All are substantive due process cases,
and while some may be wiser than others, none can be less or
more legitimate.
I shall argue, however, that the Warren Court criminal
procedure landmarks can be recharacterized as procedural due
process cases. The only substantive entitlement required for
rehabilitating them in this way is a constitutional right
against punishment except for conduct that violates a contemporaneous provision of positive law. In the absence of such a
substantive constitutional entitlement there is no point to any
procedural safeguard, however rudimentary; if the government
has the constitutional authority to punish people who are
innocent, acquittal at a trial of any description would not bar
the defendant's punishment.

nine are confusing, bordering on random; but there can be no doubt that to the Gitlow
Court freedom of speech and press was nothing but another species of the "liberty"
protected by substantive due process. This same "liberty" included the right to
freedom of contract, the constitutional value animating Coppage and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
109. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 531:
The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as guaranties
against the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative. It did not enter into
the minds of the barons to provide security against their own body or in favor
of the Commons by limiting the power of Parliament; so that bills of attainder,
ex post facto laws, laws declaring forfeitures of estates, and other arbitrary acts
of legislation which occur so frequently in English history, were never regarded
as inconsistent with the law of the land ....
110. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 58, at 43-72.
111. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
112. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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I think it fair to impute this substantive entitlement to the
due process clause," 4 although it also could be grounded on
the equal protection or privileges and immunities clause. The
central violation of due process is punishment without trial,
the abuse attributed to King John and proscribed by Magna
Charta. But this conclusion presupposes that punishment can
be imposed only according to the law, for otherwise there
would no issue to be tried. Thus, a constitutional guarantee
of fair procedure logically entails some substantive constitutional entitlement as well. The connection between substance
and procedure is therefore not as artificial as sometimes
supposed.
Because no one asserts that states retain constitutional
power to punish either status 115 or conduct that has not been
outlawed," 6 the precise scope of the substantive limit on the
causes for punishing individuals does not matter. For the
purposes of criminal procedure I am willing to assume that the
only substantive limitations on state power to punish are an
equal protection requirement that conduct rather than mere
status be the cause of punishment, and a due process requirement that this conduct be prohibited prospectively by positive
law. Given these two limits, constitutionally required procedural safeguards in criminal cases are not themselves among
the fundamental principles at the foundations of our political
institutions. Rather, the due process clause requires these
procedures because without them unauthorized punishment,
forbidden by the fourteenth amendment, would be visited on
individuals. If this is so, the Warren Court criminal procedure

114. This would follow from the origins of the idea of due process in Magna
Charta's chapter 39, as well as comport with the understanding of the current
Supreme Court. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Court, per
Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the constitutionality of preventive pretrial detention,
but freely conceded "the 'general rule' of substantive due process that the government
may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial." Id. at 749.
See also Johnson v. United States, 805 F.2d 1284, 1288 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
("To punish a person criminally for an act that is not a crime would seem the
quintessence of denying due process of law . . ").
115. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that the eighth
amendment, incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, forbids punishment for the
crime of being addicted to narcotics).
116. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (striking
down a vagrancy ordinance for failing to identify what is criminal with reasonable
clarity).
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cases rest on more than the fragile and disreputable predicate
of substantive due process. For examples, consider the tallest
lightning rods on the Warren Court edifice, Mapp and
Miranda.

A. The Case of the Exclusionary Rule

Conservatives criticize the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule because, without any legitimate constitutional basis, it
frustrates the search for truth at trial." 7 This critique is
mistaken, because legitimate sources of constitutional law
require some protection for innocent victims of official detention and home invasion. If the fourth amendment had never
been written, the fourteenth amendment due process clause
would justify something very similar to the Warren Court
restrictions on searches and seizures.
Arrest or home invasion without cause violates the same
principle that is violated by punishment without trial. The
innocent will suffer needlessly. Arbitrary home invasion
unambiguously advances the cause of truth; afterward we
know the target was innocent. But the intrusion is irreversible.
Arrest and search differ obviously from punishment without
trial, because arrest and search involve a lesser intrusion, and
justifications for arrest and search are easier to prove. These
differences are of degree, however, not of kind. The close
relation between the conditions of probation and parole, which
only a conviction can support, and arbitrary detention and
The
home invasion by the police, suggests as much."'
search or seizure of persons who have not engaged in illegal
conduct offends the core principle of due process, that illegal
conduct must be proved before inflicting punishment.
The principle, however, bends to necessity. The system must
impose burdens on people in the course of investigation long
before anything like certainty of guilt can be shown. Sometimes the burden falls on persons who have committed no
crime but for whatever reason possess evidence regarding one.

117. See, e.g., REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 575.
118.

See, e.g., N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 6.02

(1983) (noting that consent to search is a common condition of probation).
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But if the principle bends, it does not break; subjecting
individuals to government intrusions and restraints on mere
suspicion is unnecessary.
Public need, not official motive, has guided Supreme Court
decisions defining when government may restrain individual
liberty without legislative authorization or formal hearing.
War" 9 and insurrection12 ° permit massive restrictions on
personal liberty. Manifest danger to self or others may justify
civil commitment.' 2 ' Clear and convincing evidence of criminal propensity may justify preventive detention.' 2 2 Yet in
each instance, due process permits the intrusion only to the
extent of public necessity and, wherever possible, imposes
formal procedure to enforce the limit.
If detention and home invasion without cause amount to
punishment without trial, as I think they do, at the same time
that public necessity demands some scope for investigation,
then due process forbids detention and home invasion without
cause but permits them with cause. What remains to be
defined is cause. Would not that definition, as a due process
matter, be supplied by reference to flexible standards of
reasonableness? And if that is so, it would be fair to describe
the result as the incorporation of the fourth amendment by the
fourteenth-although there is no logical necessity to do so.'2 3
If detention and home invasion without cause violate the
Constitution by needlessly punishing the innocent, then due
process further requires a rational procedure for testing the
existence of cause. Here, then, is the procedural due process
aspect of search and seizure law. Whenever the government
implicates "life, liberty, or property," due process ordinarily
requires a preliminary hearing. 2 4 Traditionally, only the

119. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
120. See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
121. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
123. Thus, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries inflicted by police use of
excessive force are grounded alternately on the fourth amendment as incorporated
by the fourteenth, or on fourteenth amendment due process simpliciter. See
Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1369 (1986) (authored by Bradley M. Campbell). The author notes, at 1390-91,
that "[the underlying concern when police use excessive force is precisely that the
police have been able to 'skip the trial' and proceed directly to punishing the detainee."
124. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).

622

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 23:4

risk of nonappearance justified pretrial detention; staying
detention until after the trial would frustrate the hearing
process itself.12 5 But exigency only defers the hearing, it
does not abolish it. The police may arrest without warrant
when they see the crime, but a hearing then must be held on
the issue of probable cause. 126 Health inspectors may destroy infected food, but a hearing then must take place on the
for
propriety of their action, with the government liable
127
cause.
sufficient
lacked
inspectors
the
if
compensation
The warrant procedure fits this mold perfectly; the search
target may not be searched without cause, and, where possible, cause must be established through a neutral if ex parte
I have elsewhere argued that much can be
procedure. 12
said for viewing the procedure as conclusive absent plain error
or procedural defect. 29 But what of the warrantless search?
Indeed, what of any search conducted without cause that does
not by some coincidence produce evidence?
Absent the exclusionary rule, the victim of such a search has
no remedy. In theory there are damages and administrative
discipline and, perhaps, a heaven for the faithful. If these
remedies worked, the exclusionary rule would not anger
anyone, because courts would not need to apply it. By the
same token, even if discipline or damages did prevent unreasonable searches, these remedies would still permit the escape
of the guilty as much as the exclusionary rule does. In fact,
the exclusionary rule is among the causes of damage actions
and internal discipline. Indeed, administrative discipline
mechanism for the exclusionary rule's
provides the essential
13
deterrent effect.
I concede that if the exclusionary rule did not deter-indeed
even if it did not uniquely deter-the conservatives would have
a case for its abolition. An exclusionary rule that does not
deter defeats the search for truth at trial without furthering
the pursuit of truth on the street. But if the rule does
uniquely deter, then its enforcement provides the only
125. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). Professor Alschuler has questioned
this reading of history. See Alschuler, Preventive PretrialDetention and the Failure
of Interest-BalancingApproaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 548 (1986).
126. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
127. See North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908).
128. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
129. See Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 941-44 (1986).
130. But see generally REPORT NO. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9.
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practical protection for the innocent who would otherwise
suffer detention and home intrusion outside the courtroom.
Thus my case for the exclusionary rule depends on the
connection between benefitting a criminal by suppressing
evidence and protecting others from arbitrary restraints on
their liberty. This connection has two components, one legal
and one empirical. On the legal level, the issue is the legitimacy of permitting one party to enforce the legal rights of
another. Professor Grano has raised article III's case-orcontroversy requirement as a bar to permitting third parties
to enforce constitutional rights, but his argument is unconvincing.'3 1
For article III purposes, the Supreme Court
132
consistently has required no more than injury-in-fact.
Congress can create private attorneys general so long as that
injury exists. 133 If enforcing the Constitution depends on a
private attorney general, there is no constitutional barrier to
the Court appointing guilty criminals to that office, for
criminal conviction is injury-in-fact.'
To describe the defendant's suppression motion as a procedural safeguard for the security of unknown persons contradicts the precept that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal

131. Grano, ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1985).
132. Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (describing the rejection of the
vicarious assertion of rights as prudential, rather than constitutionally required);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (same).
133. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940).
134. The Supreme Court has permitted injured persons to assert the constitutional
rights of others when success would avert the threatened injury in several contexts
characterized by the practical inability of the right-holders to raise their own claims.
Because the justification for rejecting vicarious claims depends on the preference for
avoiding unnecessary adjudication and for adjudicating only with the assistance of
vigorous advocacy, when the third party has a strong incentive to litigate and the
right-holder has none, the usual rule is set aside. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
195-97 (1976) (allowing beer sellers to attack a limitation on the right of young males
to buy beer on the ground that the limitation violates equal protection rights of these
potential buyers); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972) (holding that
supplier of contraceptives may rely on consumers' right to privacy to attack law
forbidding distribution of contraceptives); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257
(1953) (allowing White real estate seller to defend an action for breach of restrictive
covenant by invoking rights of potential Black purchasers). The Barrows opinion
states that
[u]nder the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which
underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule
of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights which
would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained.
Id.; see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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rights that may not be asserted vicariously."' 3 5 I cannot
think of a stronger argument on behalf of this approach. The
refusal to extend standing to suppress at least to the target of
the investigation grossly disserves the deterrent purposes of
the rule, and this disservice falls disproportionately on
innocent persons. 136 Doubters are referred to United States
v. Payner,13' a vulgar wink at lawless government that
should be required reading for every admirer of former Justice
Lewis Powell. Those undisturbed by Payner should peruse
Bradford v. Johnson,"' a case in which a statement obtained
by pressure on the testicles of A was offered in evidence
against B.' 39
Precedent scarcely stands in the way of reform; the standing
cases provide the only setting where the Supreme Court treats
the exclusionary rule as a personal remedy rather than a
systemic deterrent. 4 ° So long as the Court subscribes to the
proposition that "the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes
every application of the
and effects cannot be restored,"'
exclusionary rule involves the vicarious assertion of fourth
amendment rights.'4 2 The same is true of certain civil
remedies. In Tennessee v. Garner,'4 3 for example, the Court
upheld a damages action brought by the father of the victim
of a fatal police shooting. Even though Garner's father was
nowhere near the scene of the killing, and therefore had no
personal fourth amendment interest at stake, the Court held

135. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978).
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
136. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
AMENDMENT § 11.32 (2d ed. 1987); Doernberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling
Collective and Individual Interests under the FourthAmendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
259 (1983); Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment
Standing Cases, 65 IOWA L. REV. 493 (1980). The most attractive alternative is the
target standing theory adopted by Justice Traynor. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
137. 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding that record obtained by burglarizing the hotel
room of his accountant was admissible against the client).
138. 354 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd, 476 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1973).
139. Id. at 1332-33.
140. On systemic or systematic deterrence, as opposed to special and general
deterrence in the context of the exclusionary rule, see REPORT NO. 2, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 608.
141. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
142. See Dripps, supra note 129, at 920-22; Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private
Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 275-77 (1988).
143. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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that he had standing to sue,' 44 implicitly approving vicarious
enforcement of fourth amendment rights. So, even if the
standing requirement itself is retained for reasons of stare
decisis, the standing cases provide only isolated authority for
rejecting the protection of constitutional rights by private
attorneys general.
On the empirical level, the exclusionary rule protects the
innocent only if it does in fact deter. The conservative
perspective ignores this relation between deterrence and
innocence. For example, the Justice Department's Report on
the issue argues that "[p]eople whose rights of privacy are
violated, but who are not prosecuted, are afforded no remedy
by the exclusionary rule."'4 5 This is true but it misses the
point. Although the exclusionary rule may not provide a
direct remedy to unprosecuted victims, it does provide a
broader even if indirect remedy by preventing harm. If the
exclusionary rule actually deters the government, the right to
privacy of many potential victims will be safeguarded and a
direct remedy will never need to be sought. The Report
proceeds to admit that deterrence is "[a]t the heart of the
current debate over the exclusionary rule,"'4 6 but I suspect
that authors who really believe this concession would have
made a stronger showing on deterrence than does the Report.
On the issue that lies "[a]t the heart of the current debate,"
the Report disregards not only new evidence on deterrence,
but almost all of the old evidence as well. The Report relies
almost exclusively on the early research of Dallin Oaks.' 4 7
The Report faithfully restates why Oaks thought the
exclusionary rule might have little deterrent effect, but
incredibly ignores the evidence that Oaks thought confirmed
his speculations:
the continued high rate of successful
suppression motions in three cities following adoption of the
rule.'4 8 If a high success rate for suppression motions provided the best evidence of nondeterrence in 1970, what do
conservatives make of the subsequent consistent, indeed
unanimous, empirical finding, based on national samples of
contemporary data, that successful suppression motions have

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 5.
REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 611.
Id.
See id. at 612-13.
Oaks, supra note 20, at 681-89.

626

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 23:4

149
become quite rare, indeed exotic?
As for the reasoning cited in the Report, that the rule can
have no direct impact on individual officers who violate
constitutional rights in particular cases, the rule was never
thought to operate solely through specific deterrence. The
Report notes only that Oaks did not address the possibility of
systemic deterrence, 5 ° but, again according to his formulation of the question and the data, the rule must deter somehow because of the low rate of successful motions to suppress.
The Report concedes that Mapp did indeed induce major
reforms within police departments, then adds lamely that "it
is less clear" how great the
deterrent effect on individual
5
officers may be as a result.1 '
Just how great the rule's deterrent effect can be is documented in a recent study by Myron W. Orfield, Jr.'5 2 Orfield
interviewed twenty-six police officers in the narcotics divisions
of the Chicago Police Department. Orfield summarizes the
results as follows:

This study-based on extensive, structured interviews
with Chicago
narcotics
officers-documents
the
exclusionary rule's significant deterrent effects. On an
institutional level, the rule has changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial procedures; on an individual level, it has
educated police officers in the requirements of the fourth

149. See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About
the "Costs"of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 617-22 (National Institute of Justice study indicates
that California prosecutors decline fewer than 1% of felony arrests because of search
and seizure problems; other studies indicate that the exclusionary rule's effect on all
stages of arrest processing "results in the nonprosecution and/or nonconviction of in
the range of 0.6% to 2.35% of felony arrests in the jurisdictions studied"); Nardulli,
The Societal Cost of the ExclusionaryRule: An EmpiricalAssessment, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 585, 598 (Table 8) (successful motions to suppress physical evidence
occurred in 0.69% of 7,484 criminal cases sampled); REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

(Rep. No. CDG-79-45) (suppression motions based on fourth amendment granted in
1.3% of 2,804 federal cases; convictions were obtained in half of the cases in which
motions were granted). Perhaps defense attorneys neglect to file motions in many
meritorious cases, but Nardulli's data do not indicate that the rate of granted motions
varies significantly with the percentage of cases in which motions are filed. See
Nardulli, supra, at 596, 598 (Table 9).
150. REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 612.
151. Id. at 612-13.
152. Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987) (authored by Myron W.
Orfield, Jr.).
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amendment and has punished them when they have
violated those requirements.
In summary, Chicago's narcotics officers are virtually
always in court when evidence is suppressed in their cases;
they always eventually understand why the evidence was
suppressed; and this experience has caused them to use
warrants more often and to exercise more care when
conducting warrantless searches. The study also demonstrates that judicial suppression, and the actions that
police officials take in response to suppression, "punish"
officers for conducting illegal searches. And although incourt police perjury clearly exists in Chicago and impedes
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, strong
institutional responses to perjury by the courts and the
police department have significantly reduced the impact of
perjury on the practical operation of the rule. Finally, all
of the officers concluded that the exclusionary rule should
be retained, albeit with a good faith exception; they
generally saw the rule as a positive development and
believed an alternative tort remedy would "overdeter" the
1 53
police in their search and seizure activities.
It seems that Oaks' study not only fails to describe contemporary suppression motion success; his nonquantitative speculations about the operation of the rule likewise fail to describe
contemporary reality.
Granted, the Orfield findings are based on interview data
obtained from officers involved in narcotics work in a single
city. The utility of exclusionary rule research, however, does
not depend on unachievable perfection. The Orfield survey
simply adds to the long list of items supporting the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule.'5 4 Against the totality of the

153. Id. at 1017-18.
154. Item: successful suppression motions have become rare, and their infrequency
cannot be explained by systemic neglect. See supra note 149. Item: warrant use
skyrocketed after Mapp, an increase so spectacular that other factors cannot possibly
explain it. See Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some New Data
and a PleaAgainst a PrecipitousConclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 708-11 (1974); Murphy,
Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement, 44 TEX. L. REV. 939, 941-42
(1966) (prior to Mapp, search warrants "had been rarely used," but 17,889 had been
obtained as of December 1965). Item: specific changes in fourth amendment law
have caused documented corresponding changes in police policy. See Mertens &
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulatingthe

628

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 23:4

contemporary evidence, the Report relies on a twenty-year-old,
three-city survey, conducted by an arch-conservative, for the
limited claim that deterrence is unproven. That high-powered
Justice Department lawyers could do no better itself provides
weighty evidence that the rule in fact deters.
Conservatives, moreover, stand in a peculiar position for
skeptics of deterrence. On the one hand, conservatives believe
that a marginal change in the probability or severity of
punishment can deter the youthful and impulsive members of
the underclass who would otherwise engage in predatory
crime. On the other, conservatives describe the "costs" of the
exclusionary rule as obvious and substantial.'5 5 One would
suppose these premises would predict the exclusionary rule's
deterrent effect on a rational police bureaucracy with such
confidence that overwhelming empirical evidence would be
required to refute the deterrence hypothesis. Indeed, what
would it say about our police departments if the rule did not
discourage police practices that result in suppression of
evidence? Only if police departments are indifferent to truth
and justice, or wholly without control over individual officers,
could the rule fail to deter.
The provision of civil actions with substantial minimum
damages might achieve the same effect. 5 6 For precisely that
reason, no one wants them. Indeed, when the police incur
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for those few unconstitutional
acts that might result in substantial damages, the prosecution
is frequently willing to deal away the criminal charge to

Police and Derailingthe Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 400-01 & nn.174-75 (1981). Item:
experienced law enforcement officials confirm its deterrent effect.
See The
ExclusionaryRule Bills: Hearingson S. 101, S. 755 and S. 1995 Before the Subcomm.
on CriminalLaw of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
335-36 (statement of G. Robert Blakey) ("To the degree that I have been involved in
[criminal justice] for 20 years, I will tell you unequivocally that the supression rule,
in fact, deters ....
Anyone who suggests to you the contrary, in my judgment, does
not know what he is talking about."); Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's
Defense, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 28, 30 (Summer/Fall 1982); Stern, Letter from Judge
Herbert Stern to Senator Charles McC. Mathias (May 12, 1982) ("I have spent my
entire career working within the criminal justice system ....
It is, I think, a slander
to suggest that our law enforcement authorities are either so stupid or uncaring that
they are .. . undeterred by what the courts say they must do ... .") (quoted in
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis"
Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 599 n.211
(1983)).
155. See, e.g., REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 693.
156. See, e.g., id. at 625-31.
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escape the prospect of liability.15 7 Whether achieved by civil
action or by suppression motion, effective deterrence of fourth
amendment violations would reduce the amount of crime
discovered and punished. The exclusionary rule makes the
cost obvious. But the plea bargain/release agreement illustrates that effective civil actions would likewise "rub our
noses" 5 ' in the release of the guilty. Damage actions that
deter would have the same advantages and disadvantages as
the exclusionary rule.
So one is left with the uncomfortable belief that conservatives favor alternatives to the exclusionary rule because they
do not deter. The Justice Department Report makes the
following observations. Since 1971, plaintiffs have filed an
estimated 12,000 Bivens 159 actions. In only five cases have
the defendants actually paid damages, and it is not known
whether any of these involved illegal search and seizure. 6 '
With respect to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Department's research discovered "fewer than three dozen reported
fourth amendment cases over the past 20 years. " 61 The
Report identifies two obvious reasons for the failure of civil
plaintiffs to enforce the fourth amendment:
first, juries
sympathize with the police and not with criminals; second,
search and seizure activity, however unconstitutional, ordinarily does not cause the kind of actual damages that our tort
162
system compensates.
With respect to internal discipline, the Justice Department
documents only seven investigations into fourth amendment
violations by its agents since 1981; none resulted in the
imposition of sanctions.' 6 3 The Department did obtain two
criminal convictions for violation of fourth amendment rights,
but the defendants were subsequently pardoned by the
President. 6 4 After this review of the alternatives, the Report concludes that "although both could be improved, the
necessary disciplinary provisions already exist in the federal

157. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987); see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV. 310, 311 n.7 (1987).
158. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037
(1974).
159. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that
direct action under fourth amendment is available).
160. REPORT No. 2, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 9, at 626-27.
161. Id. at 630.
162. Id. at 627.
163. Id. at 623.
164. Id. at 621 n.128.
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system and federal civil remedies provide adequate redress
and deterrence in their present form." 6 5
I believe, at least at the federal level, that serious search
and seizure violations are quite rare. But if the exclusionary
rule deters, this is only to be expected. Take away the
suppression remedy and show an ambitious officer the figures
in the Justice Department's report, and the situation is likely
to change. To abolish the exclusionary rule, leaving the rights
of the innocent to depend solely on civil actions and internal
discipline, would be to leave security against arbitrary
detention and home invasion in the same condition as the
victim of an Aztec sacrifice: bound to the altar and armed
with a sword of feathers.
The conservative hostility to the exclusionary rule thus
provides an excellent example of the myopic premises that
alone can support that hostility. Policy considerations support
the exclusionary rule because it uniquely deters arbitrary
invasions and restrictions of individual liberty. Those who lift
the conservative blinders and look beyond the trial will
classify this result as an unequivocal advance for criminal
procedure's appropriate concern with separating the innocent
from the guilty. 6 ' The most ancient sources of due process
confirm the legitimacy of reading the fourteenth amendment
as imposing this judgment on the states. Nearly three decades
of Supreme Court precedent have followed this reading, and
more than a century's worth has applied this approach against
the excesses of federal agents.'6 7 Only dogmatic acceptance
of the conservative premises could justify casting aside this
precedent for the sake of legitimacy and truth. But given
dogmatic belief in those premises, thoughtful people might
well accept casting aside this precedent, even after so shallow
a review of the law and the empirical evidence as is mustered
in the Report.
B. The Case of Confessions
The conservative critique of Miranda,Escobedo and Massiah
makes good sense from the vantage point of conservative

165. Id. at 639.
166. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
167. The case law begins with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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assumptions. Because constitutional limits on the power of
police to obtain admissible confessions diminish the truthfinding capabilities of the trial, the courts should not impose
such limits unless clearly commanded to do so by the Constitution as originally understood.16 8 Again the conservative
approach condemns the Warren Court precedents as deviations from legitimate constitutional authority at the expense
primary policy
of truth finding, which conservatives see as 1the
69
goal served by the criminal justice system.
But those who modify the conservative premises as I have
suggested probably will find nothing illegitimate or unwise
about the Warren Court confessions cases. Of course, excluding a confession always damages the search for truth at trial,
but if truth at trial were our primary goal we would not
hesitate to coerce confessions without limit. Conservatives
170
staunchly defend the old due process voluntariness test,
but it is hard to see why. There is no suggestion that the
ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment intended specifically to
prevent the states from coercing confessions.
Coercion
advances substantially the search for truth at trial. So
although the conservative premises yield a critique of
Miranda, they also yield an equivalent critique of Brown v.
Mississippi.171
But if coercion can be punitive in effect, then what happens
in the station house can punish the innocent just as can what
happens at trial. I have no moral objection to formal compulsion of incriminating answers through the same set of sanctions employed in civil cases.' 72 In contrast, the courts must
reject evidence obtained through the abuse of one suspect if
other suspects are not to be subjected to similar treatment.

168. The Justice Department's Report on Miranda has evoked extensive debate.
See Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987); Markman, The
Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering
Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938 (1987); Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice:
A Reply, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 950 (1987); Grano, Miranda's ConstitutionalDifficulties:
A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988).
169.

See REPORT NO. 1, PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, supra note 41, at 439.

170. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Grano,
Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
171. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The deputy in charge of interrogating Brown testified
in court that Brown confessed to murder only after being whipped, but that the
whipping was " ' [n]ot too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it
were left to me.'" Id. at 284. The Supreme Court held the confession involuntary
and therefore a violation of due process. Id. at 287.
172. See Dripps, supra note 67.
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That due process bars coercive methods of interrogation, quite
apart from any incorporation of the fifth amendment privilege,
seems undeniable once one considers the case of the tortured
suspect who does not break. There is no incrimination, but
the suspect nonetheless suffers official violence without the
authorization of a criminal conviction.
From this perspective, what commends Miranda is not the
protection of the suspect's autonomous choice. The warnings
pretty clearly have not impeded law enforcement because they
17 3
do so little to protect the "free will" of persons in custody.
But the warnings have contributed generally to a more
humane police culture, and they surely impose some limits on
police tactics in specific cases.'74 The reading of rights
affects the questioner, even if it glances off the suspect. Only
a corroded conscience could live with reading the Miranda
card by the glare of the arc lamp. And the law-abiding police
interrogator must tread rather lightly; too much pressure and
the suspect may invoke the right to counsel.' 75
Miranda does cut off interrogation in some instances when
the police might have elicited evidence without brutality. The
common practice of secret questioning, however, fully justifies
the presumption that without warnings a confession is
produced by unlawful methods. But the warnings respond to
the problem awkwardly. If a legitimate resolution of the
doctrinal problem of fifth amendment compulsion can be
found, I would support a rather different prophylactic approach.
Standard police interrogation practices are not fair-minded
gambits in a sporting contest, but neither are they anything
like the moral equivalent of the rack and the screw. However
manipulative, nonviolent questioning does not seem any more
coercive than a thorough search of one's home, or more odious
than wiretapping. Nor is there anything inherently evil about
questioning in privacy, as opposed to secrecy.' 7 6 But before
the police subject any person to questioning, they ought to

173.

For a review of the empirical evidence, see Dripps, supra note 68, at 722 n.91;

see also SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 28-29 (1988).

174. We know, for example, that in both Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the invocation of Miranda rights resulted
in the prompt, if temporary, cessation of interrogation.
175. See, e.g., Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
176. On this distinction, see Weisberg, Police Interrogationof Arrested Persons: A
Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 21 (1961).
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have the obligation of establishing, before a neutral magistrate, probable cause to interrogate.
Such an "interrogation warrant" would authorize the
detention of the suspect for the purpose of questioning at the
station for a limited amount of time, with the interrogation
either witnessed by a neutral observer or recorded on videotape. By making interrogation a practice requiring specific
judicial authorization, instead of the presumed concomitant of
lawful arrest, interrogation would be regulated rather than
merely tolerated. Just as with a grand jury, defense counsel
would not be permitted to participate. The suspect could be
warned of his right to silence, but the revised premises I have
endorsed do not require any protection for the suspect's free
will as distinct from the infliction of gratuitous suffering.
In short, I propose treating police questioning as a searchand-seizure problem rather than as an entirely distinct police
practice.
Present law does not require warnings or the
presence of counsel before consent to search can be given.
Indeed, when the police have obtained a warrant, the individual may not refuse consent, and one who does may be overcome
by force and if necessary, by deadly force.
More fundamentally, the evil of coercive interrogation lies
not in the discovery of probative evidence but in the use of
gratuitously cruel pressures to make the discovery. 7 '7 When
police attempt but fail to coerce a confession, their victim has
an excessive force claim, not a self-incrimination claim. Even
noncoercive questioning can injure the suspect far beyond the
injury of arrest itself."78 Lawful arrest, to be sure, carries
with it authority to search, but it does not carry the authority
to conduct any search, however intrusive. In Schmerber v.
7 9 the
California,'
Court allowed a warrantless blood test
only because of the exigent circumstances presented by the
evanescence of the evidence. 8 ° In Winston v. Lee,"' the
Court disallowed a surgical search for a bullet in defendant's
body even though a state trial judge authorized the

177. See Dripps, supra note 67, at 718-23.
178. See the illuminating discussion of Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1986) in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CASES,
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 560-70 (7th ed. 1990).
179. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
180. Id. at 770-71.
181. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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search.' 8 2 Typical custodial interrogation adds at least as
much as a blood test to the coercive restraint of arrest.
Because the suspect's memory is far less transient than his
blood alcohol content, interrogation ought to be authorized
independently of the arrest.
The treatment of interrogations as a search and seizure
problem would permit the police to question when necessary,
but not at whim and not in secret. The doctrinal problem
remains, however, and it is a formidable one. If the suspect
18 3
has the fifth amendment privilege before the grand jury,
there seems no way to deny it at the station house. Warnings
might suffice, under current law, to cure the compulsion
problem, but some suspects will take advantage of the
warning. Certainly defense counsel must be excluded if the
interrogation is to succeed. So I continue to believe that
rational confessions law awaits the abandonment of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Pending that reform, a search-and-seizure approach to
confessions might well improve on Mirandaby securing more
evidence with less hypocrisy and less brutality. But those
concerned with official abuse of the innocent will not wage war
against Miranda. If the alternative to Miranda is the old
voluntariness test,'8 4 they will count themselves among
Miranda's staunch supporters.

IV.

IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TRIAL PROCESS

The intensity of the debate about Mapp and Miranda calls
to mind a professor's favorite epigram, that academic politics
are so bitter because the stakes are so small. For every
prosecution aborted by the constitutional exclusionary rules,
roughly a hundred founder because of numbingly prosaic
procedural problems.' 85 The guilty go free primarily because

182. Id. at 763-66.
183. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
184. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55-6 (1895); see generally REPORT No. 1,
PRETRIAL INTERROGATION, supra note 41, at 465-71.

185. To paraphrase Eliot, between arrest and conviction falls the shadow. See
Forst, Criminal Justice System: Measurement of Performance,in 2 ENCY. OF CRIME

& JUSTICE 479, 481 (S. Kadish ed. 1983) (typical rate of conviction following arrest
is 50%); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 178, at 12 ("In the end, at

least as to felonies, the cases against 30-50% of all arrestees will be dropped as a
result of such [prosecutorial] screening." (footnote omitted)). There is some debate
about whether case attrition results from poor police work and the difference between
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justice takes too long and because the witnesses do not testify
when the trial finally occurs.' 86 Granted that it is easier to
talk about constitutional law than it is to talk about bringing
order to the South Bronx or East St. Louis, constitutional
doctrine poses only one modest hurdle, among many enormous
barriers, to the realization of a less violent society.
In this regard the silence of the legal academy is indefensible. Conservatives and liberals alike have little interest in
justice as administered. But no matter what vision of a good
society or the Constitution one entertains, one would still
approve of reforming procedure so as to increase the chances
of convicting the guilty and reducing the chances of convicting
the innocent.
A society as thoroughly victimized by
transformative politics as any "crit" could wish must enforce
criminal laws."'
As for the conservatives, overruling
Miranda and repealing the fourth amendment would do
almost nothing to reduce the crime rate if justice as administered does not change first.
If those arrested on probable cause faced a trial within six
weeks at which the witnesses could testify in safety and with
convenience, and from which they could be absent only at

the probable cause standard governing arrest and the reasonable doubt standard
governing trial, or instead reflects the police practice of arresting for purposes other
than initiating prosecution. See J. PETERSILIA, A. ABRAHAMSE & J. WILSON, POLICE
PERFORMANCE AND CASE ATTRITION 34-36 (1987). Both explanations surely play some
role in the true account of lost arrests, but neither impugns the constitutional
exclusionary rules. To the extent arrests are thrown out because the police never
intended a prosecution, the exclusionary rules do not deter and, even if they did, they
would not prevent any convictions. To the extent that witness problems and
insufficient evidence account for lost arrests, the exclusionary rules are not to blame
except to the extent that they may deter unconstitutional investigations.
A San Diego study provides a fair measure of the exclusionary rules' relative
importance in the overall process of criminal justice. The study revealed that about
half of the arrests for selected serious felonies failed to result in a conviction. Of
these 885 lost arrests, only 9 were attributed to the exclusionary rules. See Davies,
supra note 149, at 621 (citing F. FEENEY, F. DILL & A. WEIR, ARRESTS WITHOUT
CONVICTIONS: How OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY (1983)).
186. See, e.g., F. CANNAVALE & W. FALCON, IMPROVING WITNESS COOPERATION 8
(1976) (survey of 1,457 felony cases indicates that 23% were not prosecuted because
of witness problems); M. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION 3-8 (1985); S. MARTIN,
IMPROVING EVIDENCE COLLECTION THROUGH POLICE-PROSECUTION COORDINATION:
FINAL REPORT, at X-3 (1987) ("Studies of the factors that contribute to convictions
and conversely to attrition rates overwhelmingly have found that the seriousness of
the offense and the availability of physical evidence and witnesses are the primary
determinants of case dispositions." (citations omitted)).
187. Indeed, the major charge brought by the radical left against American
criminal justice is that the class structure results in underenforcement of laws
typically violated by businesses. See, e.g., Kelman, The Origins of Crime and
Criminal Violence in THE POLITICS OF LAW 218, 221-22 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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substantial cost, there would be no pressure to overrule the
Warren Court precedents. Instead, there would be a crisis in
our correctional system that would compel America to think
about reducing prison sentences to the levels prevailing in
other Western societies. Such a flood of convictions might
even cause the sober reexamination of a drug policy animated
by illusions more bizarre than any narcotic can induce.
Experienced observers might say that speedy trial is
impractical. Yet the constitutional minima for a criminal trial
are surprisingly informal. A jurisdiction that chose to punish
nonhomicidal street crime solely on a misdemeanor basis could
try complaints, punishable by six months in jail, without a
Indeed, the trial of such a
jury and without appeal.'
charge need be no more formal than the preliminary hearing
as presently conducted in many jurisdictions.18 9 Yet from
the standpoint of defendants, such a system would provide far
more procedural protection than does plea bargaining, as
much "procedure" as most defendants ever see. 9 °
As for obtaining the appearance of witnesses, the first step
would be to establish confidence that trial will take place on
a scheduled date. The second would be to make witness
intimidation one of the most serious felonies on the books.
Third, it would be appropriate to compensate witnesses
realistically for the value of their time (which might of itself
spur greater reliability in trial scheduling). Witnesses who
refuse to testify should be subjected to some sort of meaningful sanction.
Administrative overhaul of the criminal justice system poses
a daunting political challenge. In the absence of some such
overhaul, however, efforts to increase the conviction rate of the

188. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989) (no constitutional right to jury trial for DUI charge carrying maximum of six months in jail);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (dictum) (no constitutional right to appeal);
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (same).
189. In California, plea bargaining frequently has taken the form of an agreement
to try the case on the cold record of the preliminary hearing. See A. ROSETT & D.
CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT:

PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 166

(1976).
190. Lloyd Weinreb has written:
The assertion that a plea of guilty is the defendant's independent choice is
valuable to us because it protects the myth of an adversary trial process, which
does not survive frank recognition that most of the time the only "defense" is a
quick, informal exchange between the prosecutor and defense counsel. To say
that the defendant chooses to forgo the trial that would normally be his and the
prosecutor, honoring the defendant's responsible freedom, accepts his choice is
comforting but false.
L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 79 (1977).
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guilty have only remote chances of success. Yet if such major
reforms are prerequisites for any significant increase in the
number of guilty persons convicted and punished, they are not
essential for steps that might help reduce the number of
innocent persons convicted and punished. Even within the
parameters of justice as presently administered, the risk of
unjust conviction might be reduced significantly.
Unfortunately, law enforcement agencies could support such
reforms in trial procedure only by recognizing that these very
agencies sometimes prosecute innocent persons. If criminallaw professionals, in government and academia, seem indifferent to the conditions that permit the escape of the guilty,
there seems little interest in the academy, and none outside of
it, in the circumstances that permit the punishment of the
innocent. Perhaps this is why the Constitution commands
some protection for the innocent, but does not facilitate, much
less mandate, the punishment of the guilty.
Consider, for example, the Justice Department's proposal to
permit the use of prior convictions as evidence of guilt.'9 1
The Report's authors point out that juries would consider such
evidence relevant, that a number of logical arguments support
inferring guilt from prior crime, and that prior convictions
contribute routinely to the decision to arrest before, or to
incarcerate after, conviction.' 9 2 But all these arguments
depend on the assumption that the discovery of truth is an
unqualified good. The Department's proposal would contribute
only marginally to convicting the guilty, but it might contribute substantially to convicting the innocent.
The very primacy of prior criminal activity in the decision to
arrest and to charge warrants disregarding it at the trial
stage. Requiring the government to adduce a different kind of
proof at trial to corroborate its arrest decision reduces the
danger of convicting the innocent person with a criminal
record, who might otherwise be arrested, charged, convicted,
and sentenced based on nothing more than a record and the
absence of an alibi.
As for the various logical arguments that might justify
inferring guilt from prior convictions, the important point is
not that logical arguments support this inference but that two
illogical arguments also support it.' 9 ' The jury might use

191. See REPORT NO. 4, CRIMINAL HISTORIES, supra note 44, at 757.
192. Id. at 725.
193. These concerns are prominent enough to enter into hornbook law. See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 99 (E. Cleary ed. 1984) ("[T]here is an obvious
danger that the jury, despite instructions, will give more heed to the past convictions
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the prior conviction as evidence of the defendant's criminal
character, and reason from a supposed propensity to commit
crimes in general to a conclusion about the crime charged in
the indictment. Perhaps more insidious is the risk that juries
will infer from the prior crimes that the defendant is a bad
person who deserves more punishment for his prior crimes,
despite inconclusive evidence supporting the crime charged.
Given a desire to find truth at trial, qualified by the preference for avoiding unjust conviction, the use of prior convictions
deserves serious reconsideration. The most plausible option,
however, is not permitting the use of prior convictions as
substantive evidence, but prohibiting the use of prior convictions to "impeach" the defendant who takes the stand. If
cross-examination does not shake the defendant's story
without the prior convictions, the convictions will do more
harm than good. In such a case, they stand as weak and
isolated reasons to disbelieve the defendant's story, but as
powerful reasons for the jurors to decide the case on grounds
other than the evidence and the law.19 4 Worse yet, the
availability of prior convictions for impeachment purposes may
deter the defendant from testifying altogether. In such a case,
the threat of marginally relevant evidence drives out centrally
relevant evidence, a perverse legal variation on Gresham's
law.
More disappointing than what the Justice Department
reports include is what they omit. There is no Report on
administrative reform of the trial process, on witness problems, on identification testimony, or on new forensic techniques such as genetic identification. Nor do any of the
as evidence that the accused is the kind of man who would commit the crime on
charge, or even that he ought to be put away without too much concern with present
guilt, than they will to the legitimate bearing of the past convictions on credibility.").
These fears have some grounding in the empirical evidence. See H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 161 (1966) ("[I]f we take the average of the cases where
the defendant has no record [or refuses to take the stand] as against the cases where
he has a record, the acquittal rate declines from 42 to 25 per cent.").
194. No one, I suppose, would consider a government witness's criminal record,
however profligate and vicious, as a reason to direct a verdict for the defense even if
the government's case depends on his testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Cravero,
530 F.2d 666, 669-71 (5th Cir. 1976). In Cravero, the government's witness, Lipsky,
admitted committing theft, narcotics use and trafficking, abetting a "particularly
brutal" murder, perjury, and forgery of his own mother's name on checks. Id. at 669.
The court nonetheless held that his testimony was sufficient to go to the jury. Indeed
the court noted that "[i]n fact, Lipsky's testimony has been believed by other juries
even after having been subjected to generally the same impeachment on crossexamination." Id. at 670 n.7. If prior convictions had a generalizable and substantial
effect on credibility, we would expect that in at least some cases their existence would
enter into the decision to direct a verdict.
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Reports address racism in the administration of justice, the
competence of appointed defense counsel, or police perjury.
It would be unfair to charge the Justice Department, or
conservatives generally, with a monopoly on indifference to
serious reforms of the trial process. There is no shortage of
liberal law professors passionately opposed to the death
penalty who are quite blas6 about how many innocent persons
may be serving life sentences. Indeed, when the charge is
sexual assault it is hard to find a law professor with bad
things to say about convicting the innocent. The conservatives, however, hold power, and their notions of reform
therefore deserve somewhat more rigorous scrutiny than does
the agenda of their tireless antagonists.
Although the prospects for convicting more of the guilty
remain quite limited, present institutions could easily assimilate some modest additional checks on the risk of convicting
the innocent. One is the application of the reasonable doubt
standard to affirmative defenses.' 9 5 A second is automatic
admission of expert testimony on the inaccuracy of eyewitness
identification in any trial at which the government relies
primarily on such identifications.'9 6 These reforms would
cost little or nothing. From a policy perspective that emphasizes the prevention of unjust convictions, the case for these
reforms is overwhelming.
A third reform may be costly but is too promising to put off:
developing the competence to discover, preserve, and test
tissue samples for genetic matching with potential suspects.'9 7 No scientific test can provide reliable results from

195. See Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1665 (1987).
196. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 206, at 624-25. There is a
substantial body of case law upholding trial court rejections of proffered expert
testimony on this issue. One of the richer ironies in the literature of criminal justice
is that "some well publicized cases of mistaken identification in the early 1970's"
include some of "those which established precedents for excluding expert testimony."
Loftus & Schneider, "Behold With Strange Surprise": JudicialReactions to Expert
Testimony Concerning Eyewitness Reliability, 56 UMKC L. REV. 1, 4 & n.15 (1987)
(citing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973)). The recent trend
seems to be in the direction of requiring admission of expert testimony. See United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d
1103 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People
v. MacDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
197. Until recently, the accuracy of the DNA fingerprinting technique was unquestioned. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E. 2d 785, 797
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171 (1990). But some experts have expressed
reservations. See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the
New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989); Kolata, Some Scientists
Doubt the Value of 'Genetic Fingerprint'Evidence, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1990, at Al,
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an unreliable sample; nor can any test match a sample from
the crime scene to a person with no other sample on record.
DNA testing has the potential not merely to convict the guilty,
but to clear the innocent conclusively of charges that might
otherwise go to trial and perhaps to sentencing. When this
potential is realized, liberals and conservatives will have
something to celebrate in common.

V.

CONCLUSION

In discussing the liberal and conservative approaches to
constitutional criminal procedure, I have aimed less at critique
than at reconstruction. If the conservative assumption about
truth-finding is modified as I propose, the liberal constitutional doctrines for the most part serve a justifiable policy
program. Whether principled constitutional interpretation can
reach that result is another question. The Warren Court cases
are now settled precedents, however, and only an originalism
out of step with the rest of our constitutional law could justify
discarding them completely.
Indeed, principled constitutional interpretation yields a
regime committed to preventing unjust punishment more
easily than it yields either the conservative abdication to
legislative will, or the Warren Court's romantic devotion to
equality and autonomy. At least this is so when we remember
that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause generates
all of this constitutional law. Fairly read, that clause provides
that the burdens on individuals required by law enforcement
must bear a reasonable relation to an impartial decisionmaker's confidence of guilt. This reading suggests a unified
constitutional theory of police practices and trial procedure, a
theory concerned primarily with guilt and innocence, and for
that reason broadly consistent with the results of the Warren
Court criminal procedure landmarks.

col. 1. The cited problems include the instability of the bands yielded by the test, the
difficulty of measuring the differences between the bands, and the challenge of
expressing the exclusionary power of the test in statistical terms. These problems
are serious, and their identification in a newspaper article after DNA evidence has
helped convict hundreds of defendants gives no credit to the defense bar. Nonetheless, it should be possible to monitor the accuracy of test results by continuously
testing samples from known sources. So long as the labs do not report unequivocal
false positives, the technique's accuracy would seem reliable enough to count as a
major advance in forensic science.

